Introduction
In young markets or products, market expansion leads to sales evolution; however in mature or equilibrium markets, sales are typically stable. 2 Competitive price responses and sales evolution or disequilibrium are a direct result of Brand competition. Since pricing decisions have a direct impact on profits and prices themselves are a function of supply-side factors like input-costs, commodity prices, a change in long-term pricing strategy is not something that Brand managers would like to do often.
Therefore, when the category itself is growing and evolving, Brand Managers may resort to other options like increasing consumer awareness and product differentiation through different advertising and positioning strategies. But when the markets are mature, there is not too much innovation and differentiation possible in the product, and consumer awareness and distribution hover around the maximum. Therefore there is a greater tendency for Brand Managers to rely on pricing and promotional strategies to improve market share.
Since market share expansion in a mature market comes directly from competitive sales declines, competitive reaction to any new marketing initiative is fierce and retail prices in general reflect the equilibrium condition of consumption.
Recent research in brand competition have leveraged Time Series techniques like Unit Root, Cointegration Tests and Equilibrium-correction models to analyze and model Brand evolution and market equilibrium. They have established that some categories, brand and control factors are stable while others are in various stages of evolution or equilibrium (for e.g. Dekimpe and Hanssens, 1995) . Dekimpe, Hanssens and Silva-Risso (1999) have enumerated the following four scenarios of market evolution:
1. Stable brand sales occurring in a stable category implying that all gains and losses are temporary and brand marketing is tactical in nature. 2. Stable brand sales in an evolving category implies a lack of long-run marketing effectiveness as the brand is unable to establish permanent gains, in spite of operating in an evolving category. 3. Evolving brand sales in a stable category implies that the brand is locked in a strategic battle for long-run position. 4. Evolving Brand sales in an evolving category, implying that firms may be able to improve not only their absolute long-run performance but also their relative position.
A Brand that is reflective of #2 above may not survive for long as the other evolving Brands within the category will most likely annihilate its market share #3 can be considered a direct result of the different performance regimes Brands may go through. Pauwels and Hanssens (2004) have suggested that brand performance is subject to two opposing influences: mean reversion and change and that neither lasts for a long time in mature markets. Therefore it is possible that in a stable category we could have brands that could be going through a regime of evolution.
Therefore both #2 & #3 can be considered as exceptions.
In general if an oligopolistic category such as the one analyzed here, if the category is evolving most likely the brands are too and if the category is stable, so are the brands that comprise it.
For the purposes of this study we can simplify this classification into: 1. Brands with stable sales in a stable category. 2. Brands with evolving sales in an evolving category.
The competitive dynamics in both cases can be captured through the sales response function, by specifying Brand sales as a function of Brand marketing and pricing as well as competitive and environmental factors, using regression-based estimation. This is generally referred to as a 'marketing-mix' model (Joseph, 2004) . A wide variety of lagged, non-linear and seasonal effects can be controlled for in this method.
Since the sales-response model for #2 would involve regression between nonstationary variables, standard regression estimation and inference become invalid (Granger & Newbold, 1974; Phillips, 1986) . In this case, depending on the existence or absence of equilibrium relationships evidenced by cointegration, either an Error/Equilibrium Correction Model, or a model in first differences could be specified (Engle, R. F. & Granger, C. W. J., 1987) .
In #1, if both sales and the explanatory variables are stationary, we can estimate the sales response function using the levels of the series. An interesting situation arises if the sales series is stationary, but some of the control variables are nonstationary. The common econometric practice is to difference the nonstationary variables, since there is no Error Correction Representation possible.
According to Joseph, 2004 , if the nonstationary explanatory variables are cointegrated, it may possible to include the nonstationary explanatory variables in their levels, since the cointegrating relationship causes their linear combination to be stationary. This is especially possible in mature categories, because of the intense competition between Brands, competing factors like retail prices or promotions neutralize stochastic trends in each other which might otherwise have led to nonstationary sales for one Brand.
For instance, consider the sales of Brand as the function of its own and its competitor's retail price; if one Brand is a price leader and another a price follower and both price series are nonstationary, they will have a common stochastic trend and in the sales equation these trends will cancel each other out since the own price and the cross-price coefficients/elasticity will have opposite signs.
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This gives us an important insight into the dynamics of mature markets; the salesprice relationship for Brands in mature markets, reflect the equilibrium condition of consumption. Competitive price responses in an effort to defend market share, creates a cointegrating condition between Brands' prices, which results in mean-reversion in sales despite nonstationarity of prices; the stochastic shocks in prices do not translate to persistent effects on sales. Sales return to equilibrium levels after temporary periods of disequilibrium. Therefore Sales become a function of not only current period Price changes but also of the lagged disequilibrium response, which causes equilibrium correction in both the Price series and the Sales series. The error correction term therefore belongs in both the difference Price Equation, which would be the Error Correction representation in the sense of Engle and Granger, 1987 , but also of the levels Sales equation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section 2 reviews the data and also undertakes a preliminary analysis of the competitive environment as a precursor to a more structured Time Series Analysis of the variables, which follows in Section 3. Section 4 develops the functional model for the sales response function for the three brands and Section 4 reviews the empirical model results. Lastly Section 5 discusses the findings and develops conclusions and some directions for further research.
Data & Preliminary Competitive Analysis a. Data:
The empirical data for this study has been collected from Syndicated Point-of-Sales information for a Beverage category. The data represents weekly sales, average retail price, price discounts, distribution, merchandising and Television advertising for three competing brands in four different geographic markets.
Due to client confidentiality and non-disclosure reasons we will refer to the three Brands as Brand A, Brand B and Brand C, and the four markets as Market I, Market II, Market III and Market IV.
The following is a list of variables that were originally tested for inclusion in each of the model estimated: 8. Television advertising for Brands A and B, represented by planned Gross Ratings Points collected from the media scheduling plans. Brand C executed very little Television advertising which was not available. The GRP data was transformed assuming a lagged log decay of the effect of TV Advertising on consumers.
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All of the above data is for weekly frequency and where they were not, they have been converted to a weekly frequency.
b. Preliminary Competitive Analysis:
We undertook a preliminary competitive analysis of the three brands to determine the competitive landscape. Below is a summary of market-shares 6 and year-over-year market share and average price changes, for the three Brands in each of the four markets:
1. Market I: For Market I, the market-shares reveal that Brand A is the dominant player closely followed by Brand B, and Brand C is a relatively small player in the category. Average price changes for Brands A and B are similar. Market share changes seem to be negligible with each Brand more or less maintaining its position in the market. Overall, from a preliminary analysis of the market shares and average Price changes in the four markets, we can see that significant Price fluctuations do not correspond to significant long-run market-share changes (This doesn't necessarily imply a low demand elasticity of price, since at the weekly levels, there might be significant short-run impact, which will only be revealed in a response model.
Unit Root & Cointegration Testing a. Unit Root Testing:
We used the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test to determine if stochastic trends were present in each of the analyzed series and control variables. We followed a methodology for unit root pre-testing for unknown DGP similar to the one outlined in Enders, 2003, pg. 213-214: 1. Start with the least restrictive of the plausible models (which will generally include a trend and a drift, and test the null hypothesis of nonstationarity. If the null hypothesis is rejected, there is no need to proceed any further. Conclude that the series doesn't contain a unit root. 2. If null is not rejected, test for the significance of the trend. If the trend is not significant we can proceed to the next step. If the trend is significant, conclude there is a unit root. 3. Estimate the model without the trend and test for the presence of a unit root using the (Tau) statistic. If the null is rejected, we can conclude there is no unit root, if the null is not rejected, test for the significance of the mean. If the drift is not significant proceed to the next step. If the drift is significant, conclude there is a unit root.
4. Estimate the model without the trend or drift and use the statistic to test for the presence of a unit root. If the null is rejected, conclude that the series has no unit root; otherwise conclude the series has a unit root.
The results of the ADF tests revealed unit roots in the data series for the Average Price for all three Brands in all four markets and also in Commodity Price series.
(Please see Appendix I for results of the ADF tests).
b. Cointegration Testing
The detection of stochastic trends in each of the average price series prompts the testing for long run equilibrium or cointegration between the average price series in each market.
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Linear combinations of nonstationary variables are also nonstationary, but there may exist some nonstationary variables whose linear combination may be stationary. Such variables are said to be cointegrated (Engle and Granger, 1987) . Engle and Granger, 1987 , recommend a Two-stage method for testing for cointegration, but this procedure is ideal for a bivariate cointegration situation as it tests for a single cointegrating relationship. A multivariate model is best served by the Johansen multivariate procedure (Johansen, 1988, and , Johansen and Juselius 1990) as there may be more than one cointegrating relation and this method tests for r cointegrating relations.
We first test all four nonstationary variables in each market (three Brand prices and the Commodity Price) for cointegration. Comparing the calculated value of the Trace statistic against critical values provided by the VARMAX Procedure in SAS ® indicates that in each market the cointegration system has a rank of 2, indicating the presence of two distinct cointegration vectors. Recursively excluding one series each from the test indicates that the Commodity Price is not cointegrated with the Average Price series. This confirms that only the three Average Price series are cointegrated.
Empirical Model
The cointegration between the Average Prices for the three Brands in consideration with the fact that the Sales series themselves are stationary gives rise to the logical conclusion that the stationarity of Sales is an outcome of the cointegration between the Price series, which is in turn an obvious corollary to the competition between the Brands. With as the long run coefficient and the disturbance term ~ I (0).
(2) can be multiplied with any scalar to derive equivalent cointegrating relationships.
Since in (1) we are fitting an I (0) dependent variable to nonstationary variables that are CI (1, 1), we are in effect estimating values of A and B that result in a linear combination of P A and P B that is I (0) and therefore, we have a stable regression, with I (0) residuals.
When we extend this to the three Brands case as we are analyzing in this study, the presence of the two distinct cointegration relationships makes it a little more complex. The two cointegration equations should be considered distinct from the sales response function while the Sales series are themselves a function of only the changes or differences of the Price Series as long as equilibrium is maintained.
Disequilibrium in one period may be caused by the shock to one of the Price series in the two cointegration equations, which is reflected in both the I (1) Price series and I (0) Sales series of the corresponding Brand. This disequilibrium is corrected in the next few periods, which is incorporated through the lagged disturbance term from the cointegration equations in the Sales Response function itself. Therefore we assume that the disequilibrium might cause a temporary change in the relative market position of a Brand through a change in sales, but this temporary shift will mean-revert in the next few periods.
With this theory we can proceed to develop the long run model for their Prices and the functional form of sales response for each of the three Brands.
Let S a , S b and S c be the sales for the three Brands A, B and C, and P a , P b and P c be their respective Prices. For simplicity sake we will leave out for now the intercept terms and the stationary variables like merchandising, discounting and Television advertising.
Therefore the two long run equilibrium models for Prices normalized on P a are as follows: 
.….(7)
Where i can be interpreted as short-term price elasticity (since we are working with logs of both sales and prices), with 1 , 5 and 9 as the own price short-term elasticities, and the remaining i as the short-term cross-elasticities in the respective sales response equations.
Since i is the adjustment coefficient for the price disequilibrium which has a negative relation with sales for most goods, typically expected sign for i should be the opposite of the expected sign for the adjustment coefficient in the error correction model for Price, i.e., it should be positive. 8 This makes economic sense, since the previous period Price disequilibrium will cause sales to move in the opposite direction and hence the current period sales will offset the price disequilibrium by moving in the same direction as the price disequilibrium.
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All the regressors in the Sales Response model are I (0), hence standard regression inference is valid. Also since current period sales do not enter current period Price equation there are no simultaneity issues and OLS should yield unbiased and consistent estimates. Since we are not differencing the Sales series, we do not lose the low frequency long-run cycles within sales, but the downside is that we might have residual autocorrelation as we don't difference the Sales series, which even though stationary will most likely be positively autocorrelated. 8 On the other hand if the error correction term were based on a positively correlated variable like Advertising, the adjustment coefficient would be negative since a positive error in the previous period would lead to a negative correction in Sales this period. 9 ab, t-1 and ac, t-1 are referred to as ec1and ec2 respectively in the results tables.
Empirical Results
We have tabulated the empirical results for the three Brands in each of the four markets in Appendix IV.
Markets I & II exhibit significant first order residual correlation. This confirms our expectation that the lack of differencing of the dependent variable might lead to low estimates of the DW statistic. For the worst offender, Brand C in Market II, we used Proc Autoreg in SAS ® to remove residual correlation.
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The equilibrium correction (ec) term did not stay in all the models. Out of the 10 Markets in which the ec term stayed in 5 came in with a positive coefficient and 4 came in insignificant for = 0.1. Interestingly in 3 markets, the equilibrium adjustment term stayed in with a very significant negative coefficient.
In the markets where the differenced price variables stayed, they have expected signs, although in 4 out of 12 markets they were not significant for = 0.1.
The short-term price elasticities (PE) are in almost all Brands and Markets reasonable and of correct sign. The stationary variables have been included only where they were significant ( = 0.1) and of the right sign. R-squares range from 0.44 to 0.74.
Own elasticities range from (2.3259) to (0.1419), with Brand C coming in with generally low elasticities, which makes sense due to its niche market position.
In Market I, Brand A own PE is (0.7781) and there are no short-run Cross-elasticities, but the adjustment elasticity for the long-run relation between Brand A and Brand B is significant (0.5348), indicating that there is no short-run pricing impact between Brand A and Brand B, but they do have a long-run cross-elasticity.
Another interesting example is the model for Brand B sales in Market I, where it has a high and significant own PE (1.0263) and Brand A is complementary to Brand B and the long-run equilibrium is between Brand B and C, therefore the short-term cross-elasticity for Brand C has the expected sign.
10 Proc Autoreg in SAS ® estimates the following equation for the AR error process: t = -1 t-1+........ -i t-n + t Therefore in the output for Proc Autoreg, AR ' ' term coefficient signs are reversed, for positively correlated t, the estimated coefficient will be negative and for negatively correlated t, the estimated coefficient will be positive. We have reversed the sign of the AR coefficient to convey a more intuitive sense of the underlying correlation structure in the error term.
Discussion and Conclusions
Although the empirical results from the market models for the three Brands leave a little more to be desired in terms of standard regression diagnostics, and significance of the adjustment coefficients which is in less than 50% of the analyzed models, the preliminary results in this study confirm at least in some cases that there is a very distinct correction mechanism between the nonstationary price variables and the stationary sales series.
The adjustment coefficients may not have an interpretation as speeds of adjustment, but they have an interpretation as elasticities of correction. Since they represent disequilibrium between prices for competing Brands, the coefficient itself is the elasticity of the equilibrium correction. For instance a coefficient of 0.3 would indicate that for every percent price disequilibrium or shock in a given period, the between the two Brands, the following period sales would change by 0.3%. In simple terms it would mean that given the other Brand's price constant a 0.3% of sales gained would be lost for every 1% equilibrium error caused by the Brand cutting its price.
The chart below is a simple illustration of equilibrium correction between the prices and sales in two competing Brands X and Y. In period 3, Brand X cuts its price by $1, causing its sales to increase by 2 units at the cost of Brand Y's sales, which dips by 2 units. In the following period, Brand Y cuts its price by $1, restoring its lost sales, and sales return to equilibrium levels, although the price series, which are nonstationary with persistent shocks, do not revert to their previous levels.
In a real market, the structure of competition is much more complex, with possibly several Brands vying for market-share. In such a complex scenario, the actions of one player reverberate through several other Brands in the category before equilibrium is restored. Also a small niche player might be insulated from the shocks in the prices of the larger players in the category although it might cointegrate with their prices due to common input costs, which is why we did not see the adjustment term staying in all models. The negative adjustment coefficients are harder to explain as it does not make sense that the previous period's disequilibrium would lead to further disequilibrium, unless the sales were nonstationary too, in which case it should have been differenced and an Error Correction Model in the traditional sense would become applicable. In the case of stationary sales, negative price adjustment coefficients might be indicative of an incorrect rejection of the null of unit root.
The above results provide a potential method to incorporate a hybrid approach of levels regression and Error Correction Modeling to better represent the dynamics of competitive pricing in mature markets. 
Appendix I-Unit Root Tests

